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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the effects of different signal injection attacks against a timedelayed networked cyber-physical system (CPS). A CPS is an industrial control system
which integrates computer networks and physical processes. CPSs are used in critical
areas such as transportation and manufacturing. A networked control system is one that
allows the controller and plant to be geographically separated by sending the control
and measurement signals over a communication network. The convenience of
controlling a plant remotely comes at the cost of increased security risk. An adversary
who gains access to the network may intercept the signals and corrupt them or simply
prevent the transmission of the signals, which may cause considerable damage to the
system. The four types of attacks simulated are i) covert misappropriation attack, ii)
replay attack, iii) undetectable attack, and iv) worst-case signal attacks. In all of these
cases, the attacker is assumed to have access to the communication network used to
send the actuation and measurement signals. All of the attacks are implemented
successfully. The covert misappropriation attack resulted in over percent error in the
nominal output signal while remaining undetected. The replay attack resulted well above
one-hundred percent error and is likely to cause considerable damage to the system.
The undetectable actuator attack forced the controller to expend more energy than
necessary for a brief period to achieve the nominal output. The worst-case attack
caused the controller to expend significantly more energy during the entire simulation in
order to achieve the nominal output.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) connect physical processes through a network of
connected elements, such as actuators, sensors, and controllers. They are used in
many fields including transportation [10], medical devices [11], and industrial process
control [12]. One example of a CPS is a natural gas pipeline network. Natural gas is
collected from a well, sent through a gathering system where it is processed, and then
sent through the transmission system [24]. The transmission system is composed of
272,000 miles of steel pipe and moves the natural gas thousands of miles to local
distribution companies. The pressure inside the transmission system pipeline is
controlled by compressor stations, located every 50 to 60 miles along the pipeline. Most
of the compressor stations are completely automated, meaning the pressure inside the
pipeline is regulated from a remote control station. The control station monitors and
records operational data from each compressor station. The gas reaches a local
distribution company, which also has a control center which monitors and controls the
flow rate and pressure via various sensors and computer programs as the gas is sent to
the customer [24]. Normal operation of these systems is often required to prevent
considerable damage, whether it be to machines or employees. When control signals
and sensor readings are able to be sent over a wireless communication network, this
allows for controllers to be located off-site and used to control the plant remotely. The
downside to this is that the network becomes vulnerable to attacks. Adversaries may
gain access to the network, intercept the signals being sent, and corrupt them.
1

Therefore, these wireless control system networks must be secure to ensure safe
operation. The type of attack described previously is called a “man-in-the-middle” attack
and has been studied greatly on networked control systems [3],[4],[5],[6]. In [27],
researchers successfully performed a replay attack on an implantable cardioverter
defibrillator (ICD) introduced into the US market in 2003. This replay attack
compromised the device‟s integrity by changing stored information or therapy settings
[27]. These ICDs are designed to administer an electrical shock to the patient when an
irregular heartbeat is detected in order to restore a normal heartbeat rhythm. The device
can then report that a shock was administered via wireless capabilities to a healthcare
provider, who is able to modify the device‟s settings without surgery [27]. Between 1990
and 2002, more than 2.6 million pacemakers and ICDs were implanted in patients in the
United States [28]. The work in [27] showed that attacks on the privacy, integrity, and
availability of the ICD data are possible. A reprogramming attack is demonstrated which
changes the way the ICD operates, allowing a malicious entity to issue a commanded
electrical shock. Also, the researchers demonstrated that the ICD disclosed sensitive
information without encryption [27]. The demonstration of these security flaws in a
device already implanted in patients is enough to cause concern for safety. Cyberphysical system attacks have successfully been carried out and are documented in
[13],[14],[15],[16]. In [16], an attack is documented wherein an attacker used a laptop
computer and a radio transmitter to take control of 150 sewage pumping stations and
released one million liters of untreated sewage into a stormwater drain, where it flowed
into local waterways. The reason for the attack is because Mr. Boden, the attacker, was
2

angry that he was not offered employment by the Maroochy Shire Council [16]. One of
the most famous cyber-security attacks is the Stuxnet worm [17], which affected a
uranium enrichment facility in Iran. The worm gained access to the supervisor control
and data acquisition system (SCADA) used to operate the centrifuges and sent
malicious control signals to cause them to malfunction with considerable damage to the
system. The designers of the SCADA systems originally did not consider security
concerns such as integrity checking, anti-replay checking, authentication, or antirepudiation due to the assumption that SCADA systems would be isolated from other
networks. SCADA communication protocols such as Modbus, Distributed Network
Protocol 3 (DNP3), and Allen-Bradley Ethernet/Internet Protocol (IP) do not provide
mechanisms to check for integrity or freshness of data received [25],[26]. Therefore,
systems that employ these communication protocols are susceptible to denial-of-service
attacks

(DoS),

man-in-the-middle

attacks,

and

replay

attacks

[26].

The

accomplishments of the previously referenced attacks and security flaws in the listed
SCADA communication protocols raise concern for the security of critical cyber-physical
systems operating today.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze four different signal attacks on a
networked control system with time delays to show how such attacks may affect the
system. Chapter two introduces the nominal control system, describes the canal testbed
to be used as a model for all attacks, and the controller used for the canal system. The
chapter shows the system performance under normal operation. Chapter three shows
the effect of a covert misappropriation attack, where control signals are summed with a
3

malicious signal before reaching the plant, and the effect of the malicious signal on the
plant is removed before the output of the plant reaches the controller, thus remaining
undetected. Chapter four presents the effect of a replay attack, in which sensor signals
are monitored and recorded for a period of time and relayed to the controller at a future
time while suppressing real-time sensor readings, thus rendering the attack
undetectable. Chapter five shows the effect of an attack, which is undetectable by a
dynamic monitor. A dynamic monitor is an algorithm which constantly checks if the
system is under attack [8]. Chapter six shows the effect of a worst-case signal attack, in
which the objective of the attack is not to remain undetected, but to maximize the cost
function and perform the most damage to the system. Chapter seven contains
concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER TWO
INTRODUCTION OF THE NOMINAL SYSTEM
2.1 Introduction
The nominal system is described and illustrated in [1] and shown in Figure 1. The
variables in Figure 1 represent the following parameters:

– Output signal of the nominal controller – Dimension (2x1)
Input signal to the plant – Dimension (2x1)
– Actuator disturbances – Dimension (2x1)
– Output of the plant – Dimension (2x1)
– Sensor noise – Dimension (2x1)
– Output sensor data received by the controller (2x1)
– Output refence signal – Dimension (2x1)

In Figure 1,

represents the plant and

represents the nominal controller for the plant.

Both the actuation and measurement signals are transmitted between the plant and the
controller

over

a

communication

network

uninterrupted

and

unmodified

[1].

Communication delays and packet losses are not considered for simplicity. In the
nominal case,

and

.The plant is assumed to be linear time-invariant

(LTI) and is driven by disturbances w, and a control signal

5

such that

Here, Pu and Pw are LTI operators that map signals uc and w to the output y [1]. In other
words, they are operators that represent the plant‟s effect on signals
output measured by the nominal controller is corrupted with noise such that

The nominal controller outputs the control signal such that

.

Figure 1. Nominal Control System Diagram [1].
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and

. The

2.2 MIMO Open Flow Canal

An open flow canal system described originally in [2] is used as a testbed to carry
out the attacks. The system is composed of two pools with two sluice gates and a
downstream spillway, illustrated in Figure 2 and Figure 3. A servomotor is used in each
gate to drive the control gate positions u1 and u2. There are two level sensors located
downstream of the first and second gates (h1 and h2, respectively). The reservoir is kept
at a constant level of 3.5 m. The length of the first pool is 2 km and the length of the
second pool is 4 km.

Figure 2. Open Flow Canal Illustration [33].
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Figure 3. Simplified Open Flow Canal Diagram [2].

This system can be modeled by two Saint-Venant equations. The simplified model is
derived in [2] and shown below. The system takes the form

[

]

[

]

where

[

]
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Each delay

is associated with the travelling time of water between each input and

output [2]. By defining

to be the travelling time of water to cover the first pool and

to

be the travelling time of water to cover the second pool as in Lemma 2.2 in [2], the
following relation can be shown:

By using this relation and separating the rational and irrational part of the plant, the
following final plant is derived [2]:

[

Where

]

[

,

seconds,

][

,

][

,

seconds,

,
seconds,

][

]

seconds,
seconds and

seconds.

2.3 Uncontrolled System Response

The uncontrolled system response to a reference step change in
meters to 0.94 meters at 200 minutes and

from 0.64

held at a constant 0.96 meters is shown in

Figure 4.
9

Figure 4. Uncontrolled Canal System Response.

From observation, it is clear that the outputs
Instead of

and

do not follow the setpoints.

rising from 0.64 meters to 0.94 meters, it only rises from 0.35 meters to

0.61 meters. The setpoint of

is held at 0.96 meters, but the output only settles at 0.71

meters. Also, the coupling of the two outputs is clear; the reference step change in
produces a large disturbance in the output

, which deviates from its setpoint 0.08

meters at the peak of the disturbance. Another problem is the large overshoot evident in
the system response. For these reasons, a controller must be used to compensate for
the tracking error between the setpoint and the output, to decouple the two outputs, and
to reduce the overshoot present in the system response.

10

2.4 Controller Description

The controller for this system is originally derived in [2]. The rational part of the
plant model is:

[

]

To guarantee nominal internal stability, any stabilizing controller, its sensitivity, its
complement, and the transfer function from the reference to the control signal are
respectively:

[

]

(1)

for any stable and proper matrix Q(s) [2]. To achieve complete diagonal sensitivities and
achieve robust stability, Q(s), Tm(s), and Sm(s) are chosen to be:

[

]
[
11

]

[
[

]
]

(2)

where

where

is a weight used to counteract the delay uncertainties and is taken to be

is the identity matrix,

, and

[2]. Next, a low-order

performance weight is selected to reject constant and low frequency disturbances as
follows:

where

[2]. To achieve robustness,

is chosen as:

(3)

where

,

and

in order to cancel the pole in

. Using equations (1), (2), and (3), the following proper controller is derived:

[

]

][

[
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]

of

which simplifies to [2]

[

Finally,

is replaced as a function of

(

)

]

using equation (1) which is easier to

implement, resulting in the final controller used for this system.

2.5 Nominal System Performance

The nominal system response is simulated in Figure 5. A noise signal is not applied in
the simulations in this thesis in order to make comparisons clearer. The setpoint of the
output

is stepped up from 0.64 meters to 0.94 meters at 200 minutes, while the

setpoint of

is kept at a constant 0.96 meters. From 800 to 1200 minutes, a

disturbance pulse signal is produced equivalent to raising the sluice gate
meters is applied. Figure 5 5 shows the nominal canal system water levels
response to a reference point change in gate
the tracking error of

by 0.01
and

. From Figure 5, it can be observed that

goes to zero due to the integral action of the controller. Also, the

controller successfully rejects the applied disturbance due to the selection of parameter
in the performance weight
apparent; the amplitude of output

. The decoupling characteristic of the controller is
is raised 0.3 meters, but the output

only moves

0.01 meters from its setpoint during the step. In the next chapter, the covert
misappropriation attack is introduced and performed on the system.
13

Figure 5. Nominal Canal System Response.
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CHAPTER THREE
COVERT MISAPPROPRIATION ATTACK
3.1 Introduction

The covert misappropriation attack is a type of man-in-the-middle attack and is
described in [1]. The covert agent is assumed to have infiltrated the communication
network in a way that allows the control signal

and sensor measurement signal

to

be read and modified. This attack allows the adversary to intercept the actuation signal,
add a malicious component to it designed to force the plant to output a signal other than
the setpoint specified by the nominal controller, and then remove the effect of the
malicious signal from the plant‟s output before it is fed back to the controller. This attack
allows the attacker to send the plant‟s output to a desired value without the nominal
controller‟s knowledge. The system under a covert misappropriation attack is illustrated
in Figure 6 6 [1]. The attacker calculates the nominal plant‟s response
signal

to its injected

and subtracts it from the measured plant‟s output. The two components of the

covert agent structure are the model of the nominal plant

and the covert controller .

It can be deduced that if the attacker knows the exact model of the plant, then the
injected signal‟s effect on the nominal plant can be calculated exactly and the attack is
completely undetectable [1]. This case has already been studied in [7]. For this
example,

will be assumed to contain model errors in order to show that the attack

can still be carried out undetected with modeling errors. The covert plant can be
represented by
15

Figure 6. Covert Misappropriation Attack Diagram [1].

where

represents the additive model error of the covert plant [1]. For this attack, the

attacker does not need any knowledge of the nominal controller in order to perform the
attack undetected. In this case, the actuation signal that is received by the plant is now

The measured output signal received by the nominal controller is now
16

The signals

and

are calculated in the feedback loop

3.2 Canal System Under Covert Misappropriation Attack

The same open-flow canal testbed is used to demonstrate the covert
misappropriation attack. The covert agent‟s plant model is given by [1]

[

where

and

][

][

]

and are used to represent the model errors of the covert

plant. These model errors contribute to increasing the time delays, gains, and time
constants by up to a factor of 2 [1]. The covert controller

is calculated using the same

approach derived in Section 2.2, with the rational part of the plant taken to be

17

].

[

The covert misappropriation attack is simulated with the setpoint

equal to zero

before 200 minutes and equal to 0.1 meters after 200 minutes. The results are shown in
Figure 7. The effect of the attack is clear. The measured output of
nominal controller is equal to 0.94 meters, while the actual level of

seen by the
is 0.84 meters.

This results in a 10.64 percent error from the nominal reference setpoint of

, and

without any mitigation techniques, this attack is undetectable by the controller. In the
next chapter, the replay attack is introduced and performed on the system.

Figure 7. System Response Under Covert Misappropriation Attack.
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CHAPTER FOUR
REPLAY ATTACK
4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the nominal system will be subjected to a replay attack. A replay
attack is a type of network attack “in which an attacker detects a data transmission and
fraudulently has it delayed or repeated” [21]. The adversary intercepts and records the
data transmission and transmits the same data at a later time while suppressing the
real-time data. Without proper mitigation, a network subject to a replay attack would
interpret the repeated transmission as legitimate [21]. Even if the data is encrypted and
the adversary cannot decrypt it, a repeated transmission of legitimate data across a
network would still be received as legitimate.

4.2 Mathematical Explanation

Let the nominal control signal be

, the control signal received by the plant be

, and the malicious control signal under a replay attack be
output signal of the plant be

. Let the nominal output measurement signal be

and the output measurement signal under a replay attack be
at time be

. Let the time of system operation begin at

length of recording
from

to

. Let the nominal

span from

to

and end at

. Let the time

and the time of the replay attack span

. Therefore, the signals can be represented as:
19

. Let the sensor noise

.

The diagram of the system under a replay attack during time
Figure 8.

Figure 8. System Diagram Under a Replay Attack.

20

is shown in

4.3 Canal System Under Replay Attack

For this section, the measured sensor output signal

will be recorded for a

period of time, and then relayed to the controller at a future time period while preventing
the transmission of

during that period. To create the attacked signal for simulation

purposes, the nominal system‟s output is recorded from 33.33 minutes to 366.67
minutes. Then from 1533.3 minutes to 1866.7 minutes, the nominal system‟s output
signal is suppressed and replaced with the previously recorded output signal. The
nominal signal and the attacked signal are illustrated in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Nominal System Output and Replay Attack Signal.
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The canal simulation is performed again, but this time the feedback signal to the
controller is disconnected and replaced with the created attacked signals. The system
response to the replay attack is shown in Figure 10. The replay attack‟s effect on the
canal system is evident. When the step change from 0.94 meters to 0.64 meters of the
attacked signal of

at 1533 minutes occurs, the controller response causes the

nominal plant to send the height of
of

to 2.45 meters. This is due to the reference point

being set to 0.94 meters and the false

output signal indicating that the plant‟s

output has fallen to 0.64 meters. Therefore, the controller sees this false output and
tries to correct it by sending actuator signals to quickly raise the output of

back to

0.94 meters, when in reality, the output was already at 0.94 meters and the controller
was fooled into raising the output of
error in the

even more. This attack led to a 160.6 percent

response when compared to the nominal output, and without any attack

mitigation techniques, this attack would be undetected by the controller and cause
considerable damage to the system. The effect of this attack is much greater than that
of the covert misappropriation attack, where the percent error in the

response was

10.64 percent. On the other hand, the replay attack is likely to be noticed by employees
due to the extreme change in the output of

, but the covert misappropriation attack

can likely be executed for a longer period of time due to the smaller effect of the attack
on

. The replay attack could be used to cause damage to the system, where the

covert misappropriation attack may be better used in order to deceive the controller for
a longer period of time. In the next chapter, the undetectable attack is introduced and
performed on the system.
22

Figure 10. System Response to a Replay Attack.
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CHAPTER FIVE
UNDETECTABLE ATTACK
5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the system will be subjected to an undetectable sensor attack and
an undetectable actuator attack. These attacks are described and defined in [9],[32] and
solved explicitly in [8]. In this reference, an undetectable attack is defined as one “that is
undetectable by a dynamic monitor.” A dynamic monitor is “an algorithm which has
access to the system dynamics and outputs
presence of attacks at all times” [9],[32] where

, and checks for the
are the state-space matrices of

the system and represent the system dynamics. The reference states that an attack
is undetectable if and only if for some initial state

(

where

(

)

(

:

) )

is the output of the system due to the initial state

control signal , the under-attack actuator signal

, the

, and the under-attack sensor signal

[9],[32]. The undetectable sensor attack signal is derived in [8] and results in the
signal:

24

Therefore, the sensor attack is always possible if the attacker knows the system‟s statespace matrices

and the initial state

. The undetectable actuator attack is also

derived in [8] and results in the signal:

where

∫

is the controllability gramian, and
matrices

represent the conjugate transpose of system

and , respectively.

5.2 Canal System Under Undetectable Attack

The inherent time delays of the canal system are not accounted for in the
undetectable sensor and actuator attacks derived in [8]. Therefore, the Padé
approximation [18] is used to estimate the delays in the irrational plant to obtain a
rational approximation. This estimation was computed using the

command in

MATLAB [19]. The minimum realization of the resulting system was then obtained using
the MATLAB command

[20]. The resulting transfer function matrix of the

system is:
25

[

]

The Padé-approximated system‟s nominal system response and the original system‟s
response are plotted in Figure 11. The approximation resulted in the system containing
uncontrollable states. Because the actuator attack relies on the controllability gramian of
the system and requires no uncontrollable states, the undetectable attacks were only
performed on the part of the system relating input 1 to output 1, which contains no
uncontrollable states.

Figure 11. Nominal System Output with Original Time Delays and Nominal System
Output with Padé Approximated Time Delays.
26

This corresponds to the transfer function in row one, column one of
referred to as

. The state-space representation of

, which will be

is obtained and the

undetectable sensor and actuator attacks are simulated and shown in Figures 12-19. It
can be observed from Figure 12Figure 12 that the amplitude of the sensor attack signal
is relatively small, only reaching a peak of

meters. The sensor attack

signal also quickly converges to zero. This is due to the system dynamics of the
approximated canal system. It can also be observed from Figure 13 and Figure 14 that
the effect of the sensor attack on the control input

and the output of

is negligible

due to the dynamics of the system. Figure 16Figure 16 and Figure 17 show that the
actuator attack signal

has a negligible effect on the canal system due to the system

dynamics. Figure 18 and Figure 19 show that even when both attacks are applied
simultaneously, their effect is still negligible. In the next chapter, the worst-case
bounded sensor signal attack is introduced and applied to the system.

27

Figure 12. Undetectable Sensor Attack Signal

. The signal only reaches a height of

meters.

Figure 13. Undetectable Sensor Attack Effect on Control Signal
attack is negligible.
28

. The effect of the

Figure 14. Undetectable Sensor Attack Effect on the Output of

. The output stays

the same under the attack.

Figure 15. Undetectable Actuator Attack Signal

. The signal quickly converges to zero

due to the system dynamics.
29

Figure 16. Undetectable Actuator Attack Effect on Control Signal

. The controller s

forced to exert more energy in the attacked case.

Figure 17. Undetectable Actuator Attack Effect on the Output of
relatively the same.
30

. The output stays

Figure 18. Undetectable Sensor and Actuator Attack Effect on Control Signal

. The

effect of the attack is negligible.

Figure 19. Undetectable Sensor and Actuator Attack Effect on the Output of
output stays the same.
31

. The

CHAPTER SIX
WORST-CASE BOUNDED SIGNAL ATTACK
6.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, the canal system will be subject to a worst-case sensor attack. The
attack in this Chapter is originally described in [8]. The goal of this attack is not to
remain undetected, but to inflict maximal damage by maximizing the control cost
function of the system. For this attack, a linear-quadratic controller is used for the
system instead of the controller previously derived. The control law minimizes the cost
function shown below while the worst-case attack signal maximizes it [22]:

‖

‖
[

The MATLAB function

{

∫

}

is used to compute state-feedback control law [22].

An LQI controller was used instead of the LQR controller due to steady-state errors
occurring when using the LQR controller. The integral term in the LQI controller forces
the steady-state error to converge to zero. The state-feedback control of the LQI control
scheme is of the form

[

]. The new state-space representation of the

system with the LQI control implemented is derived as:

32

̇
̇

̃
̃̇
̃
̇̃

̇
[ ̇]
̃

[

[

] ̃

∫
]
[ ]

The control law diagram is shown below in Figure 20 [22].

Figure 20. Diagram of the LQI Control Scheme [22].

The function [

]

state-space model

calculates the optimal gain matrix
for the plant and weighting matricies

approximated system previously computed is used for
,

.

[22]. The Padéare chosen to be

, and , respectively.

The performance of the nominal controller is shown below in Figure 21.

33

, given a

Figure 21. Nominal System Performance with LQI Control.

It should be noted that this type of controller cannot be used on this system in reality, as
the state variables of this system measure by the controller are not tied to physical
parameters but can be related to physical states using a similarity transformation. The
purpose of this Chapter is simply to show the effect of such an attack on a canal system
with these properties. The optimal sensor attack for infinite horizon LQI control is
derived in [8] and [30], and also used in [29]. The cost function for this problem is
derived as

{∫

}
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where

is a positive semi-definite matrix,

vector of control variables, and

is the vector of state variables,

is the

is the output matrix in the state-space representation

of the plant [8],[29],[30]. The minimizing control input is given by

where

is

the solution of the algebraic Riccati equation [23]:

In the infinite horizon case for bounded sensor attack signals,
meaning

[

, and with ‖ ‖

some

where

‖

[

‖

[

,

, where ess sup stands for essential supremum, for
, the optimal sensor attack signal is

is the space

is a scalar representing the maximum bound

threshold an attacker can expend, and

is the normalized right singular vector

corresponding to the maximal singular value of

[8],[29],[30]. The optimal worst-case

actuator attack is not used in this thesis, but it is derived in [8],and [31], and used in
[29].
6.2 Numerical Results
The nominal system is subjected to this sensor attack with
results are shown in the Figures 22 and 23.
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and the

Figure 22. Output

Figure 23. Control Input

with and without Optimal Sensor Attack.

with and without Optimal Sensor Attack.
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From Figure 22 it can be observed that the controller eventually corrects the output
to converge to the nominal value after 150 minutes. On the other hand, it can be
observed from Figure 23 that the control signal energy expended is 0.16 units higher
than in the nominal case for the entire duration of the simulation. Therefore, this attack
succeeded in maximizing the cost function of the system. Compared to the covert
misappropriation attack, the effect of this attack does not affect the output

as much

but forces the controller to expend more energy. The replay attack on this system has a
higher impact on the output of system due to the 160.6 percent error in

. The worst-

case bounded sensor attack forces the controller to exert much more energy than the
undetectable attack. The next chapter contains concluding remarks.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
Four types of malicious cyber-physical system signal attacks have been
described, and their effects on a time-delayed system have been analyzed. All of the
attacks were implemented successfully. The covert misappropriation and replay attacks
caused significant error between the nominal output and the under-attack output. The
effects of the undetectable sensor attack were negligible due to the system dynamics
and only one part of the system being attacked. The effect of the undetectable actuator
attack was also negligible but resulted in a larger control signal and therefore expended
more energy than necessary. The covert misappropriation attack resulted in a 10.64
percent error in the nominal output signal while remaining undetected. The replay attack
resulted in a 160.6 percent error and is likely to cause considerable damage to the
system. The undetectable actuator attack forced the controller to expend more energy
than necessary for a brief period to achieve the nominal output. The worst-case attack
caused the output

to deviate around 0.12 meters from the nominal response, but

after 150 minutes, the output signal converged the nominal value. However, the
controller was still affected throughout the whole simulation and the attack caused it to
excerpt significantly more energy than required in the nominal case. Future work
includes performing the undetectable sensor and actuator attacks on a different
networked control system, in which all states of the plant are controllable with system
dynamics such that the effect of the attack is more pronounced. Another area that could
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be studied in the future is developing mitigation strategies and detection algorithms for
the covert misappropriation attack, undetectable attacks, and worst-case sensor attack.
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